In England, the academic year runs strictly from 1 September to 31 August, so that a child born on 31 August will start school (and sit exams) up to one year earlier than a child born only one day later, on 1 September. Responsibility for determining school admissions policies falls on local, (rather than central) authorities, such that there is considerable geographical variation in terms of length of schooling (and the age at which children start school) amongst the youngest members of each cohort. This paper exploits these two features of the English education system to look at the impact of month of birth on test scores whilst children are in school, as well as on subsequent further and higher education participation. The unique nature of the English system enables us to split this difference into an age of starting school or length of schooling effect, a relative age effect and an age of sitting the test effect. We find that the month in which you are born matters for test scores at ages 11, 14 and 16, with younger children performing significantly worse, on average, than their older peers. Furthermore, almost all of this difference is due to the fact that younger children sit exams up to one year earlier than older cohort members. The difference in test scores at age 16 potentially affects the number of pupils who stay on beyond compulsory schooling, with predictable labour market consequences. Indeed, we find that the impact of month of birth persists into higher education participation by age 19. The fact that being young in your school year affects outcomes after the completion of compulsory schooling points to the need for urgent policy reform, to ensure that future cohorts of children are not adversely affected by the month of birth lottery inherent in the English education system.
Introduction
This paper addresses the long term effects on education outcomes of the age at which children start school. Understanding how age at start of schooling affects the ultimate educational attainment of individuals can help design admissions and examinations policies to mitigate any negative effects. As our results show, the effects are substantial, even at later ages, and offer the opportunity of low cost and effective reform.
It has been documented across many countries that children born at the end of the academic year (which runs from 1 September to 31 August in England) perform more poorly, on average, than older members of their cohort.
2 A number of factors may contribute to this: first, in a system in which exams are taken at a fixed date, some children will sit them up to a year younger than others ("absolute age" or "age of sitting the test" effect); these children may also suffer from the fact that they were "too young" when they started school ("age of starting school" effect). Moreover, the younger children may be adversely affected by the fact that they are younger than their peers ("relative age" effect). Finally, depending on the admissions system, some of the younger children may have attended school for fewer terms prior to the exam ("length of schooling" effect).
However, there is relatively little reliable evidence on how each of these factors contributes to the performance shortfall of younger children in a cohort, particularly for longer term compulsory schooling outcomes 3 , with two recent exceptions: Fredriksson and Ockert (2005) use Swedish administrative data for the population born 1935-84 to look at the impact of school starting age on education and labour market outcomes. They find that increasing school starting age by one year increases grade point average at the age of 16 by 0.2 standard deviations. They exploit within-school variation in the age composition across cohorts to separate the impact of relative age (the age position effect) from the impact of absolute age (plus the effect of school entrance age) and find that relative age accounts for only 6 per cent of the difference in test scores at that age. 4 However, they can only separate the effect of age at entry to school from absolute age by looking at outcomes after the end of compulsory schooling (when there is independent variation between the two).
They find that starting school later has a small positive impact on earnings (although they point out that the net earnings effect over the life cycle is negative, because starting school later implies entering the labour market later as well).
5 Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2008) identify the impact of school starting age on IQ scores, educational attainment, teenage pregnancy and earnings using Norwegian administrative data. They find that starting school younger has a significant positive effect on IQ scores at age 18 and the probability of becoming a teenage mother, but little effect on educational attainment. In contrast to Fredriksson and Ockert (2005) , Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2008) find that starting school younger has a small positive effect on earnings, but that this effect has disappeared by age 30. This pattern is consistent with the idea that starting school later reduces potential labour market experience at a particular age (for a given level of education), but that the importance of this year of experience is reduced as individuals age.
Our paper adds to the existing literature by exploiting a key feature of the English education system: that school admissions policies are determined by local, rather than central, education authorities. 6 This gives rise to considerable regional policy variation in the age at which children born a particular day of the year start school. As 4 We adopt a similar approach to identify the impact of relative age -see Section 2 for details.
5 It should be noted that there is never any variation in length of schooling in this paper. 6 There are around 150 Local Authorities (LAs) -which are responsible for setting admissions policies -in England.
we are able to observe exact date of birth, this enables us to separately identify the causal impacts of age of sitting the test, age of starting school (or length of schooling, not both 7 ) and relative age for both compulsory and post-compulsory schooling outcomes -something that no other papers have been able to do.
The rest of this paper will now proceed as follows. In Section 2, we outline our modelling approaches. Section 3 provides more information about the data-sets that we use and Section 4 describes our sample. In Section 5, we concentrate on Augustand September-born children (those either side of the academic-year cut-off in England) and document the August birth penalty for a variety of test scores and education participation decisions measured at ages 11, 14, 16, 18, 19 and 20. Section 6 moves on to exploit geographical variation in admissions policies to decompose the differences in attainment observed between August-and Septemberborn children into an age of sitting the test effect, an age of starting school (or length of schooling) effect and a relative age effect. Finally, Section 7 considers how policy could be used to address the disadvantage faced by children who are amongst the youngest in their year.
Modelling approach
To estimate the impact of month of birth on education outcomes, we adopt a regression discontinuity approach, running regressions of the following form:
where T ik = 1 if individual i is born in month k (where k=1 are August-born children, k=2 are July-born children and k=12 are September-born children, our omitted category), and t is a cohort dummy. In Section 5, we present results estimating this 7 Note that there is insufficient variation in the admissions policies implemented in England for us to be able to separate the effect of age of starting school and the effect of length of schooling.
model using August-and September-born children only, to illustrate the effects of the discontinuity on similar aged children who are born up to one month either side of the academic year cut-off.
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In this model, we are making comparisons within schools (and therefore within admissions policy areas 9 ), so as long as the observed and unobserved characteristics of students at the school and the effectiveness of the school do not vary by date of birth, we will difference out the impact of this (assumed) fixed effect and obtain the causal impact of being born in month k=1 (August) compared with being born in month k=12 (September).
10
If we are able to ascertain that there is a significant difference between the outcomes of children born in different months, then gaining a fuller understanding of the underlying causes of these differences becomes very important. In most countries, it is extremely difficult to separate the impacts of absolute age (age at which the child sits the test), age of starting school and length of schooling on compulsory schooling outcomes, because there is an exact linear relationship between the three:
Age at test = Age of starting school + Length of schooling 8 We have also estimated the impact of being born in every month compared to September. These results are available from the authors on request.
9 Note that local authorities (LAs) are not responsible for the admissions policies of all state schools in their areas; some are free to choose their own admissions policies. Between 2001-02 and 2006-07, LAs were responsible for admissions policies covering approximately two thirds of the state school population. Our analysis assumes that all schools follow the admissions policy set by their LA, such that we estimate something more akin to an intention-totreat effect. The question we are asking is 'What is the impact on child cognitive outcomes of starting school in an LA that follows one admissions policy rather than any other?'. This should, theoretically, weaken the treatment effect, so our estimates are likely to provide a lower bound to the true impact of date of birth on education outcomes. 10 We can check the validity of part of this assumption by testing whether the probability of being a k=1 born child compared with the probability of being a k=12 born child varies by observed characteristics. This could happen if parents from certain backgrounds try to ensure that their child will always be one of the oldest in the school year through conception decisions, or if children from certain backgrounds who are amongst the youngest in their year are more likely to be put into private schools (our data is for state school children only). Initial analysis of our sample suggests that there is some evidence that children who are eligible for free school meals (a proxy for low family income) are around 2.7 percentage points more likely to be born in August than children who are not eligible for free school meals. (Buckles & Hungerman (2008) find similar results for the US.) Hence, we always control for observed background characteristics (although in practice this does not make any difference to our results). Results without controlling for observable characteristics are available from the authors on request.
If all children in a particular cohort start school at the same time and sit tests at the same time, then it is impossible to identify these three effects separately.
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However, whilst it is the case that children in England all sit tests at the same time,
there is geographical variation in the age at which children start school and the number of terms of schooling they receive prior to the tests. If we assume that unobserved geographical variables do not affect test scores, this allows us to separate the impacts of age of sitting the test and age of starting school (or length of schooling) on education outcomes. (We must also assume that exposure to a particular policy is independent of outcome, which is just the standard conditional independence assumption.)
In addition, because the age distribution of a particular cohort within each school varies (we assume this variation is independent of the unobserved determinants of achievement), we can also look at the impact of relative age (age position), which we measure as the proportion of pupils older than the child in their school cohort.
To separate these effects, we use a simple regression model of the following form:
Where:
where 1(free) is a dummy variable which takes value one for all schools that are free to choose their own admissions policy
In addition, the oldest children (in absolute terms) in each cohort will also be the oldest relative to others in their class, so the age position effect may also play a role.
All age variables are measured in days and "proportion older" is the proportion of older children in the child's school year group.
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We estimate this model using our entire sample -i.e. including children born across all months and all admissions policy areas. Again we have a cohort dummy t and include school fixed effects. Given that we are comparing children across admissions policy areas (and hence schools) to identify these effects, it becomes very important to control for all observed characteristics that might affect school choice and academic outcomes (see Section 3.2 for details of the characteristics for which we are able to control).
Appendix B shows that estimates of the mean difference in the proportion achieving the expected level between August-and September-born children in the younger group obtained using the two different modelling approaches described above are virtually identical, giving us confidence that we can safely rely on both of these approaches in our analysis.
Data
We use data from the English National Pupil Database (NPD), an administrative data-set comprising academic outcomes in the form of Key Stage test results for all state school children aged between 11 and 16, plus limited background characteristics (including date of birth, home postcode and a school identifier) from the Pupil Level Annual School Census (PLASC). We also have access to data on post-compulsory schooling outcomes, including academic and vocational qualifications achieved by age 18 and higher education (HE) participation at ages 19 and 20 (the first two years of potential HE participation). At Key Stages 2 and 3, the main subjects assessed are English, maths and science.
Test score outcomes: the Key Stage tests
In each case, pupils are allocated an attainment level, which can be translated into a corresponding points score (using a specified formula) ranging from 15 to 33 at Key
Stage 2 (with 27 being the expected level) and from 21 to 51 at Key Stage 3 (with 33
being the expected level). 13 For each subject, we calculate whether a pupil achieved the government's expected level on the basis of their assigned score.
At Key Stage 4, students tend to sit exams in up to 10 subjects (including English, maths and science). We make use of the students' capped average point score (that is, the score averaged across their eight best exam results), plus a variable indicating whether the pupil achieved at least five A*-C grades (the expected level).
At Key Stage 5, students can choose between a wide range of academic and vocational qualifications. We make use of a variable indicating whether the pupil achieved a Level 3 qualification (the expected level) via an academic routeequivalent to (for example) two A-levels at grades A-E. 13 Note that for Key Stage 2 and Key Stage 3 results, we also have access to raw test marks, which allow one to calculate a much more detailed average point score than that described above. We used these raw test scores to check the difference it makes using continuous scores. Using discrete rather than continuous measures of educational attainment makes virtually no difference to our results.
Background characteristics
PLASC records pupil-level information, including date of birth, entitlement to free school meals (which can be thought of as a proxy for very low family income), ethnicity, whether English is the students' first language, plus whether they have special educational needs. It also includes a school identifier.
In some of our models, it is important to control for observable characteristics that are likely to affect school (and therefore admissions policy) choice and educational attainment. To compensate partially for the lack of family background characteristics available in PLASC, we use the pupil's home postcode to map in neighbourhood characteristics, such as the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 14 and variables from the 2001 Census, to control for any local area influences on academic outcomes.
These are included alongside the available individual-level data to generate the following list of controls:
• ethnicity;
• whether English is the child's first language;
• whether the child is eligible for free school meals;
• quintiles of the IMD, plus quintiles of the domains comprising income, employment, and education, skills and training;
• quintiles of the Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index (IDACI);
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• age distribution of the Output Area (OA) 16 in which the child lives;
• proportion of lone parents (OA level);
• proportion of working-age population in employment (OA level);
• social class (OA level);
• highest educational qualification of local population (OA level).
Admissions policy information
Children in England must have started school by the beginning of the term after they turn five: this is considerably earlier than in many other countries. As admissions policies are set by local (rather than central) authorities in England, however, there is considerable geographical variation in the admissions policies in place in particular areas. We exploit this variation (through which children born on a particular day start school at different ages) to separately identify the impacts of age of sitting the test and age of starting school (or length of schooling) on academic outcomes. Table 3 .1 provides a summary of the different admissions policies that are in operation in England, together with the proportions of pupils who attend schools in areas affected by these policies in our sample.
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It should be noted that we only observe the local authority in which students sat Key Stage 2 (age 11), not the local authority in which they started school. This means that that if the child has switched authorities since they started school (from one with a different admissions policy in place in the year in which they started), then the information (on age of starting school and length of schooling) that we assign to the child may be inaccurate.
We have checked the importance of this potential measurement error by analysing the difference between estimates obtained by assigning admissions policy according to local authority at age 11 rather than local authority at age 5 using some younger cohorts. We do not find any evidence of significant differences as a result of mismeasurement of admissions policy information.
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17 Appendix A illustrates the accuracy of our admissions policy information (which was collected retrospectively).
18 Results available from the authors on request. 
Two entry dates
Policy 2A 0.6% Children born 1 September to 31 March start school in the September of the academic year in which they turn five; children born 1 April to 31 August start school in the January of the year in which they turn five.
Policy 2B 0.6% Children born 1 September to 30 April start school in the September of the academic year in which they turn five; children born 1 May to 31 August start school in the January of the academic year in which they turn five.
Policy 2C 6.5% Children born 1 September to 29 February start school in the September of the academic year in which they turn five; children born 1 March to 31 August start school in the January of the academic year in which they turn five.
Policy 2D 0.3% Children born 1 September to 31 December start school in the September of the academic year in which they turn five; children born 1 January to 31 August start school in the April of the academic year in which they turn five.
Three entry dates
Policy 3A ('rising 5s') 22.4% Children start school at the beginning of the term in which they turn five, so children born 1 September to 31 December start school in September, children born 1 January to 30 April start school in January and children born 1 May to 31 August start school in April.
Policy 3B (statutory) 1.6% Children start school at the beginning of the term after they turn five, so children born 1 September to 31 December start school in January, children born 1 January to 30 April start school in April and children born 1 May to 31 August start school in September of the following academic year. 
Our sample
Our sample comprises all individuals who were born in academic years 1985-86 and 1986-87 (who started school in 1990-91 or 1991-92) , for whom we observe test scores in the expected year from Key Stage 2 (age 11) to Key Stage 4 (age 16).
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This gives a total of 921,130 individuals. Amongst other things, this means that we eliminate from our analysis individuals who do not start school in the expected year and/or who do not progress through the system in the usual manner (although this is a very minor problem in England -we drop only five individuals from our analysis for this reason). It also restricts attention to individuals who attend state (public) schools in England.
20 Appendix C provides summary statistics for a younger group of students, namely those who were born in 1990-91, 1991-92 or 1992-93 (who started school in 1995-96, 1996-97 and 1997-98) , for whom we observe test scores at age 7, age 11 and age 14.
outcomes between August-and September-born children that we document in Section 5. 
Males Females
This figure shows that outcomes for August-born children are always lower than those for September-born children, but that this gap steadily decreases (in percentage terms) between age 11 (Key Stage 2) and age 19/20 (higher education participation). It also shows that girls perform significantly better than boys, on average, at all ages, and that August-born boys have the worst absolute outcomes.
August birth penalty
This section documents the extent of the August birth penalty in terms of education outcomes from age 11 to age 19/20. We focus on differences in standardised average point scores and proportions of students reaching the government's expected level at Key Stages 2 (age 11), 3 (age 14) and 4 (age 16). We also consider differences in the proportions of August-and September-born children who achieve a Level 3 qualification (the expected level) by age 18, and differences in the proportions that go on to participate in higher education (HE) at age 19/20. at Key Stage 4 (age 16), which is the set of exams taken in UK year 11 (grade 10 in the US). These tests determine whether a child will continue into post-compulsory education and also define the first record that can potentially affect college admissions. Even at that point, the younger children score between 13% and 15% of a standard deviation lower than the older ones. This translates into a massive 5.7 to 6.8 percentage point higher potential drop out rate from high school for the younger findings (results across cohorts available from the authors on request).
children. The table also shows that August-born children are around 1.5 percentage points less likely to enrol in college than September-born children.
Thus starting school a year earlier than others implies underachievement when young and longer term impacts on attainment. The latter will have direct implications on earnings. Bur even the underachievement at younger ages may have effects that
are not fully picked up by attainment. Notes: All results presented are based on an individual-level model with school fixed effects. All models include cohort dummies, individual-level characteristics (including ethnicity, whether the child is eligible for free school meals and whether English is their first language) and a series of neighbourhood characteristics (see Section 3.2 for details). ** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level; * indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the school level.
Decomposing the August birth effect
We now move on to use our more structured regression model to decompose this August birth penalty into an absolute age (age of sitting the test) effect, an age of starting school effect (which, in the English school system, cannot be separated from a length of schooling effect) and an age position (relative age) effect. 22 We do this by exploiting geographical variation in local admissions policies, as a result of which children born on the same day may start school at different ages, and hence receive a different amount of schooling prior to the tests. 
Total sample 460,445
Notes: All results presented are based on an individual-level model with school fixed effects.
All models include cohort dummies, individual-level characteristics (including ethnicity, whether the child is eligible for free school meals and whether English is their first language) and a series of neighbourhood characteristics (see Section 3.2 for details). ** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level; * indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the school level. 
Total sample 460,685
Notes: All results presented are based on an individual-level model with school fixed effects. All models include cohort dummies, individual-level characteristics (including ethnicity, whether the child is eligible for free school meals and whether English is their first language) and a series of neighbourhood characteristics (see Section 3.2 for details). ** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level; * indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the school level.
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present the regression coefficients for absolute age (age of sitting the test), age of starting school and relative age (proportion of school year older) for girls and boys respectively. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 translate these coefficients into estimates of the August birth penalty, and show how these estimates can be decomposed into an absolute age, age of starting school and relative age effect for August-born children. The August birth effect (column (ii)) is based on the individual-level model with school fixed effects. All estimated effects (columns (iv), (v) and (vii)) come from our regression model. All models include cohort dummies, individual-level characteristics (including ethnicity, whether the child is eligible for free school meals and whether English is their first language) and a series of neighbourhood characteristics (see Section 3.2 for details). ** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level; * indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the school level. The August birth effect (column (ii)) is based on the individual-level model with school fixed effects. All estimated effects (columns (iv), (v) and (vii)) come from our regression model. All models include cohort dummies, individual-level characteristics (including ethnicity, whether the child is eligible for free school meals and whether English is their first language) and a series of neighbourhood characteristics (see Section 3.2 for details). ** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level; * indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the school level.
As a simple test of our specification, Tables 6.3 and 6.4 start by comparing our estimates of the August birth penalty obtained from this regression model (Column iii) with those obtained non-parametrically using the regression discontinuity design discussed in Section 5 (Column ii). For both boys and girls, the results obtained using the two alternative methods are either identical or differ by very small amounts, which are certainly not significant.
These results suggest a simple story: the key issue is the absolute age effect, which captures the fact that (taking length of schooling into account) there is a clear and strong negative effect of sitting exams younger. Thus, for an exam system (like the one in the UK) in which there is no flexibility over the time at which exams are sat, this translates into long term negative effects, including higher school drop-out rates and lower participation in higher education.
Given the age one must sit the exams, our results also suggest that it is slightly better to start school earlier; this is a simple quantity of schooling effect. Finally, there seems to be an insignificant negative effect of being among many older children; our findings suggest that it is better for children to be among peers of their own age.
Policy implications and conclusions
This paper has shown that there is a significant penalty associated with date of birth, such that the youngest children in a particular academic year perform significantly worse in cognitive tests than the oldest children. Furthermore, this penalty remains significant at age 16 -when individuals are making choices about whether to stay on beyond compulsory schooling -and also affects higher education participation decisions at age 19/20.
We have shown that the driving force behind this penalty is simply that summer-born children have to sit tests up to 11 months earlier than their autumn-born counterparts.
This implies that the inflexible form of the British system, where children are assessed at a fixed point in time (e.g. at the end of year 11, equivalent to US grade 10), can have long term and permanent detrimental effects, if only because it leads to a greater likelihood of dropping out of high school and a lower probability of college attendance.
Policy thus needs to address this issue by improving the flexibility of assessments.
One simple way of doing this would be to age-normalise exam results at Key Stage 4, which determine who qualifies for post-compulsory education. This makes sense because our results indicate that the younger children are catching up. So if they are not made to drop out and they are suitably supported while in school, they will perform as well as their older counterparts with the same overall ability. In addition, as far as exams leading to qualification are concerned it makes sense to have many examination periods and for children to sit for such exams when ready.
Finally, it may be important to understand whether the high early failure rates for the younger children have other effects not reflected in the test scores we measure at older ages. We plan to explore these issues in future research. Notes: All models include cohort dummies, individual-level characteristics (including ethnicity, whether the child is eligible for free school meals and whether English is their first language) and a series of neighbourhood characteristics (see Section 3.2 for details). ** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level; * indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the school level.
Appendix C 1990-91, 1991-92 or 1992-93 (who started school in 1995-96, 1996-97 and 1997-98) , for whom we observe test scores (in the expected year) at age 7, age 11 and age 14. 1990-91, 1991-92 or 1992-93 (who started school in 1995-96, 1996-97 and 1997-98) , for whom we observe test scores (in the expected year) at age 7, age 11 and age 14. All results presented are based on an individual-level model with school fixed effects. All models include cohort dummies, individual-level characteristics (including ethnicity, whether the child is eligible for free school meals and whether English is their first language) and a series of neighbourhood characteristics (see Section 3.2 for details). ** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level; * indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the school level. 1990-91, 1991-92 or 1992-93 (who started school in 1995-96, 1996-97 and 1997-98) , for whom we observe test scores (in the expected year) at age 7, age 11 and age 14. The August birth effect (column (ii)) is based on the individual-level model with school fixed effects. All estimated effects (columns (iv), (v) and (vii)) come from our regression model. All models include cohort dummies, individual-level characteristics (including ethnicity, whether the child is eligible for free school meals and whether English is their first language) and a series of neighbourhood characteristics (see Section 3.2 for details). ** indicates significance at the 1 per cent level; * indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the school level.
